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of the
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vs.

Oase No.
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Defendants, Respondents.

9921

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an Appeal from a Judgment by the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge of the Third Judicial
Distric-t Court from an Order and Judgment of Non-suit
and Judgment for Defendant Non Obstante Verdicto in
favor of the defendants and against the Plaintiff. Plaintiff is seeking reinstatement of a Special Verdict in his
favor and against the Defendants. The case arises out
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of a collision between two automobiles at an intersection
which resulted in personal injury to the plaintiff, and
damage to his automobile, causl.ng loss of e'arnings and
medical expenses.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case now on appeal was presented to the Jury
by the Trial Court on a Special Verdict. Special Verdict
consisted of two propositions :
Proposition No. 1 read as follows:
PROPOSITION NO. 1
The Plaintiff was contributorily negligent in
the operation of his automobile in the following
particulars:
(a)

In not keeping a proper lookout.....................

No preponderance of the evidence
either way.
(b) In failing to yield the right-of-w.ay
to the defendant

X
False

No preponderance of the evidence
either way
....................
(c) In failing to have· his automobile
under control

False

..................................

No preponderance of the evidence
either way
....................
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(If you have answered "True" o:n a Subdi~s~on
of Proposition No. 1, do not consider Proposition
No.2)

PROPOSITION NO. 2 concerned damages only,
and the Jury Verdict amounted to $3,131.09.
The Court entered Judgment upon the Verdict in
favor of the plaintiff, and against the defendant for the
$3,131.09; thereafter, on Motion for New Trial filed
by the defendants, the Court made its Order and J udgment of Non-suit, and Judgment for defendant, N. 0. V.,
the Court finding as a matter of law, that the plaintiff
was contributarily negligent, failing to keep a proper
lookout, and in failing to yield the right of way to the
defendant's vehicle which entered the intersection first,
and at a time when plaintiff's vehicle was not in the
intersection, or so close as to constitute .an immediate
hazard. From this Order the Appeal was prosecuted.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff, by this Appeal, seeks to have this Court
reinstate the Judgment on Verdict entered on the Special
Verdict as found by the Trial Court Jury, on the ground
that the Court's Order violates the rights of the plaintiff
as guaranteed by Amendment No. VII of the Constitution of the United States in that said Amendment provides as follows :
"In suits at Common Law, where the value
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in Controversy shall exceed $20.00, the right of
Trial by Jury, shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined
in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the Common Law."
And Article "I" Section 10 of the Constitution of Ftah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 31st, 1962, at approximately 4:45 P. M., at
the intersection of 2nd South and 3rd West Streets in
Salt Lake City, Utah, a truck driven by Defendant,
J am·es, on the business of Cornwall vVarehouse Company,
collided with a 1957 Chevrolet Station Wagon, being
driven by plaintiff, the owner thereof.
Plaintiff filed his action. Defendant answered, and
the Pretrial Order set the issue to be tried as those set
forth in the Complaint and Answer. The Complaint
charged defendants with negligence as follows:
a)

Failure to keep a proper looxout;

b)

Failure to keep said automobile under proper control ;

c)

Failure to yield the right of way;

d)

Failure to stop at the stop sign on Third
West Street at the intersection;

t
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r)

Entering said intersection when it was not
s·afe to do so; ·and

f)

~ntering

said intersection at a speed which
was not reasonable under the circumstances.

The Answer denied negligence on the part of the
dei'Pndants, and alleged as an affirmative defense that
the accident was caused solely, or pro:ximately contributed to by the negligenee of the plaintiff.
At the intersection where the collision occurred, the
eastbound traffic on Second South has the right of way
over the southbound traffic on 3rd West, and northbound
traffic on Third West. Traffic moving west on 2nd
South is also required to stop by a stop sign at the
intersection.
The only traffic having the right to proceed through
the intersection without stopping being traffic eastbound
on 2nd South.
Plaintiff was eastbound on 2nd South, Defendants
W(:\re southbound on 3rd West, and making a left turn
through the intersection to go east on 2nd South.
As Plaintiff approached the intersection, he observed the truck of defendant stopped at the stop sign
facing south on 3rd West Street. (Record 139). He proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ceeded through the intersection at a speed of from 20 to
25 miles per hour, and was struck on the left rear side
of his car as he approached the east side of the intersection. He saw the defendant's truck a moment before the
impact occurred.
Plaintiff testified that he looked for traffic and was
alert to the hazards in the intersection, (R. 141, 142),
and saw the defendant's truck coming at him from the
left side moments before the impact occurred. (R. 142).
Plaintiff's estimate of defendant's speed was between
10 to 15 miles per hour. Defendant's estimate of his own
speed was 8, 9, or 10 miles per hour (R. 256).
The trial Court, on the basis of the evidence outlined,
found as a matter of law "The plaintiff was contributorily negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout and
in failing to yield the right of way to defendant's vehicle
which entered the intersection first and at a time when
plaintiff's vehicle was not in the intersection, or so close
as to constitute a hazard, and that plaintiff's claim is
barred by plaintiff's contributory negligence. (R. 88)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT.
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The Trial Court, by its 111ling setting aside the verdi..t in favor of th€ plaintiff and against defendants is
ruling in effect that even though plaintiff is on a street
protected by a Stop Sign, he must continuously watch
the automobile which has stopped for the intersection,
and avoid in every event any movement by such automobile.
The Intersection Laws of the State of Utah have
been the subject of legislative enactment since the last
rase discussing this matter of which the plaintiff Is
aware. The intersection law now reads as follows:

"Section 41-6-73: Vehicle turning left at Intersection. - The driver of a vehicle within an
intersection intending to turn to the left shall
yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching
from th€ opposite direction which is within the
intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an
immediate hazard, during the time when such
driver is moving within the intersection."
This Section now makes it the duty of a driver approaching from a stop sign to yield the right of way to
all vehicles that are so close as to constitute an immediate hazard, "during the time when such driver is moving within the intersection." There can be no question
now, under this Section which was enacted by the Legislature in 1961, that a person on a disfavored highway
must wait until traffic which might be a hazard to him
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while he is moving in the intersection has cleared through
the intersection.
The Section of the Law which was applicable to intersection right of way, prior to 1961, was Section 41-674, U. C. A. 1953 which provided that a person after
stopping for a stop sign could proceed if no vehicle was
approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate
hazard.
Plaintiff submits that under the facts and circumstances of this case, there could not be presented a purely
legal question as to plaintiff's contributory negligence.
The question is one of the most difficult, complicated,
and sensitive questions of fact, and as a oonsequence,
must be left to the Jury for determination if plaintiff
is to be granted his constitutional rights to a trial by
Jury.
The general law seems to be clear. It is stated in
Volume 5A American Jurisprudence, page 686, Section
712:

"A driver who makes reasonable observation
before entering an intersection is not contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failing to
make additional observation. "\Vhen it appears to
be safe to cross an inters·ection, an automobile
Driver's contributory negligence in the light of
the defendant's unanticipated speed or other
negligence is for the Jury.
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"Clearly, however, the fact that the plaintiff
proceeded into or across an intersection with the
ti·affie signal or sign in his favor ordinarily precludes finding him guilty of such negligence as a
matter of law, and he is sometimes held free of
contributory negligence as a matter of law in such
circumstances.''
See also : Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automo h]e
Law and Practice, Volume 10, Part 2, Section
6619 P. 10-17, and 1956 Cumulative Pocket Part,
No. 6619, P. 7-20.
This Court adopted the rule set forth as a general
law in the United States in the case of Will~ams vs.
Zion's Cooperative Mercamtile Institution, 6 Utah 2d.
283, 312 Pac. 2d. 564.
This Court, in the Williams case stated the Law
which we believe is beyond possibility of distinction on
facts very simil·ar to those now before this Court. In
that case, the Court stated;
"A fact question was presented as to whether
defendant entered the intersection when plaintiff
was therein, or if defendant entered the intersection when plaintiff was approaching so closely on
said through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard. The further fact question was presented as to whether defendant had entered the
intersection under such circumstances as to impose on plaintiff the duty of yielding the right of
way. Those are proper jury questions and should
have been submitted.
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"After plaintiff observed defendant stopped
at the stop sign, plaintiff traveled the 25 feet and
the north half of the intersection with Third Avenue before the impact occurred. At 20 miles an
hour, plaintiff would travel that distance in less
than a second and a half. Had plaintiff without
the loss of any tim·e whatsover realized, when she
saw defendant stopped, that defendant was going
to pull into the intersection, regardless of plaintiff's position, still with most favorable road conditions and a vehicle mechanically perfect,
plaintiff would have traveled 43 feet and into the
course of defendant's truck before her car could
have been stopped. We cannot say that plaintiff
was negligent as a matter of law in driving into
the intersection under the conditions present.
Plaintiff's negligence, if she was negligent, in so
doing is not so apparent that all reasonable minds
would .agree upon that fact.
"Nor are we able to say with certainty that
her negligence, if any, in so doing was the proximate cause of the accident. That, too, was a fact
question to be determined by the Jury - being
one on which reasonable minds might well and
probably would disagree."
In addition to the Williams case, this Court on several occasions has held that in intersection collisions a
more difficult and closer question, as far as contributory
negligence is concerned, can hardly be conceived. In the
following cases, this Court has steadfastly held that in
intersection collisions where time, distance, and other
such important factors are a matter of opinion, and
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usually driver opinion, the question of negligence, conhibutory negligence, are matters which should be left
for the Jury to determine. See the following cases:
Beck v. Jeppesen, 1 Utah 2d 127, 262 Pac. 2d 760, Martin
v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 Pac. 2d. 747, Poulsen v.
Mantness, 121 Utah 269, 241 Pac. 2d. 152, Lowder v.
Hallen, 120 Utah 231, 233 Pac. 2d 350; Martin v. Sheffield, 112 Utah -!78, 189 Pac. 2d. 127. B,ates v. Burns, 3
(Ttah 2d. 180, 281 Pac. 2d. 209, and Larsen v. Evans, 12
{Ttah 2d. 45, 364 Pac. 2d, 1088, are additional Utah cases
which demonstrate the adherence of this Court to the
basic and fundamental rules that questions of negligrnce, contributory negligence and proximate cause, in
intersection collisions are questions of fact, ·and cases
which require the Jury not only to find facts, but to
apply standards of care, and the Jury, the·refore, must
be left to apply the standards and determine the basic
facts.

There are several cases from jurisdiction other than
Utah similar to the situation before the Court. One of
the most interesting cases is Pollind v. Polic"'fb, 78 Cal.
App. 2d 87, 177 P. 2d. 63. In this case the person on the
disfavored roadway observed the favored driv-er a~
proaching approximately two hundred feet away. The
question was whether or not the favored driver was contributorily negligent as a matter of law in failing to observe the disfavored driver leave the stop sign and proceed into the intersection. The California Statute is
~imilar to the Utah law quoted. The Court stated:
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"Defendant had a right to assume not only
that the car in which plaintiff was riding would
make the required stop at 43rd Street, until he
observed or, in the exercise of ordinary care,
would have observed that the Driver was not making a stop, but also that the Ford car would not
enter the intersection in front of cars approaching so closely as to constitute hazard. Defendant
testified that he saw the Ford car approaching
when it was about 30 feet west of the intersection,
but as he was passing the Pulliam car his view of
the Ford was obstructed as he approached the
intersection, and that he assumed that Secrest,
the Ford driver would stop long enough to allow
his car and the Pulliam car to pass through the
intersection first. He also testified that he next
saw the Ford when it was about 12 or 15 feet in
front of him, but that he, the defendant, could
not swerve to the right to avoid a collision because of the Pulliam car. Secrest testified that
he saw the Pulliam car approaching but did not
see that of defendant. It was clearly a question
of fact whether defendant was guilty of negligence in assuming that Secrest would not enter
the intersection in front of his car and that of
Pulliam, but would remain at the boulevard stop
sign until the two cars had passed." (Page 65).
An additional authority directly in point concerning
the duty of the person on a through highway is De Priest
v. City of Glendale, 74 Cal. App. 2d 464, 169 P. 2d. 17.
Here, the plaintiff admittedly failed to maintain a constant lookout as he approached the intersection and did
not observe the car which came into collision with him.
The California Court following the general rule again
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held that tmder the fads and circumstances the negligt>net- and contributory negligence were questions of fact
for the Jury to determine.
One of the most important cases which seems to be
dirt-('tly in point is Mead v. Cochran, 184 F. 2d. 579. This
ea~e involved an accident on the open highway. The defendant left a stop sign after stopping and turned in
front of the plaintiff's automobile. There was a collision.
The basic question was whether or not plaintiff was contributorily negligent since his testimony indicated that
he did not see the defendant's car at any time prior to
the impact. The Fede·ral Circuit Court following the
gmwral rule, held this was a question ·of fact to he submitted to the jury to apply the basic standards of care
on the part of the driver of the automobile on the through
highway. The following quote sets forth the facts and
ruling:

"Furthermore, plaintiff did testify that he
looked to his left about 100 feet from the intersection and that before reaching that point there
were trees and bushes on his left along old Route
40 which obstructed his view. Under the circumstances it might be that defendant's stationary car
did not make a permanent mental impression
upon the plaintiff. Defendant's automobile had
been at a stand-still at some point within 15 to
23 feet distant from the pavement of new Route
40. Defendant suddenly started his automobile in
motion, intending to cross the center line of new
Route 40 and then swing to his left in order to
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proceed along it in a northeasterly direction."
"Under the facts of this case we believe that
the question of contributory negligenc·e was a
question of fact for the jury." (Page 581).
In Foresman v. Pepin, 71 F. Supp. 772, affirmed
161 F. 2d. 872. Plaintiff approached on a through highway and observed that on her left the traffic on the
highway was stopped, she then proceeded to cross
through the intersection and did not look to the right to
see the truck of defendant which was approaching and
which ultimately came into collision with her. It was conceded that if plaintiff had looked to the right at the
intersection, she may have been able to avo[d the collision with the truc;k owned by the defendant. The Federal
District Court submitted the case to the Jury. He overruled the motions for a new trial and was affirmed on
appeal. Held that the contributory negligence of plaintiff was a question of fact for the jury.
The discussion in the Foresman case concerns the
normal habits of drivers who are on through highways
and who cross intersections where other traffic is waiting. Once a driver commits himself to a certain course of
conduct, i. ·e., crossing the intersection, additional observation may or may not he possible. The significance
of the driver's actions in eithe-r causation or in applying
the standards of care is for the jury to determine. It
would be a very unusual situation if the driver could
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prevent collision should another vehicle enter the intersection after he had commenced the crossing.
CONOLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the lookout which
a person approaching an intersection on a through highway must ma:ke is dependent upon the surrounding circumstances. Whether the lookout is one which is reasonablP, which a prudent person would make, must be left
to the Jury for its determination. Whether the making
of additional observations would have prevented a collision is also a fact question. The trial Court erroneously
granted the verdict Non Obstante Verdicto. This Court
~hould reverse the trial Court ruling, order the rein~tatemPnt of the verdict in plaintiff's favor, and award
to the plaintiff his costs as incurred
Respectfully submitted,

GAYLE DEAN HUNT, and
DWIGHT L. KING
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
to Counsel respondent this ____________day of Ociober, 1963.
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